



Office of Inspector General | United States Postal Service

Audit Report

Review of Postal Inspection Service Criminal and Administrative Processes - Fort Worth Division

Report Number HR-AR-19-002 | April 19, 2019



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Highlights

Objective

The mission of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service is to support and protect the U.S. Postal Service and its employees, infrastructure, and customers; enforce the laws that defend the nation's mail system from illegal or dangerous use; and ensure public trust in the mail. In fiscal year 2018, the Postal Inspection Service had about 1,300 postal inspectors located in 17 divisions across the nation.

Postal inspectors are federal law enforcement agents responsible for enforcing more than 200 federal statutes that deal with the Postal Service and the U.S. mail. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has a statutory requirement to provide oversight of activities of the Postal Inspection Service. As such, we plan to conduct similar reviews of other Postal Inspection Service divisions.

Our objective was to assess the U.S. Postal Inspection Service's compliance with criminal and administrative processes, including the effectiveness of internal controls. Specifically, we reviewed the areas of case management, accountable property, and training in the Fort Worth Division, which was judgmentally selected based on number of investigative cases.

The Fort Worth Division has 46 postal inspectors located in Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. From August 2017 to July 2018, the Fort Worth Division had 299 closed cases — 80 area cases and 219 jacketed cases. Area cases are typically established to conduct preliminary investigative work, whereas a jacketed case is opened when there is indication or occurrence of criminal activity warranting further review.

We reviewed a statistical sample of 55 cases (24 area and 31 jacketed) to determine whether postal inspectors documented investigative activities in accordance with policy. To determine whether arrest details and reporting requirements were met, we reviewed a total of 42 jacketed cases with arrests.

What the OIG Found

The Postal Inspection Service complied with prescribed criminal and administrative policies related to high-value evidence, electronic surveillance, confidential funds, firearms, and threat management training. Processes related to these areas included effective internal controls.

However, we identified areas of noncompliance and opportunities to strengthen internal controls in relation to case management and reporting practices, inventory management, and vehicle authorizations. We identified:

- Postal inspectors did not properly document investigative activities in area and jacketed cases related to investigative summary logs, field notes, and arrest details.
- Postal inspectors did not properly document claimed arrests made by other law enforcement agencies.
- Fort Worth management did not maintain ammunition inventories or track the division's ammunition usage.
- Fort Worth Division personnel did not conduct annual O key inventories or issue O keys in accordance with policy. O keys access observation areas at postal facilities, thus restricting surveillance activities to law enforcement personnel.
- Long-term home-to-work authorization justifications for law enforcement vehicles did not meet prescribed criteria.

These conditions occurred because team leaders did not enforce case management policies or conduct comprehensive reviews of case files; there were no formal requirements to inventory or track ammunition; there were no controls to ensure that O key inventories were appropriately conducted; and management decided to override vehicle policy requirements based on circumstances presented by postal inspectors.

What the OIG Recommended

We recommended field management provide refresher training to team leaders, establish a control mechanism to ensure accountability of O keys, reiterate documentation requirements when claiming arrests from outside law enforcement entities, and analyze vehicle authorizations.

We further recommended headquarters management enhance the Closed Case File checklist and the Compliance Self-Assessment and Domicile Review Program to reconcile with case management documentation requirements and establish requirements and processes to inventory and track ammunition.

Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

April 19, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR: GARY R. BARKSDALE
CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR

THOMAS L. NOYES
INSPECTOR-IN-CHARGE, FORT WORTH DIVISION

E-Signed by Charles Turley
VERIFY authenticity with eSign Desktop

FROM: Charles L. Turley
Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Supply Management & Human Resources

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Review of Postal Inspection Service Criminal
and Administrative Processes – Fort Worth Division
(Report Number HR-AR-19-002)

This report presents the results of our audit of the Review of Postal Inspection Service Criminal and Administrative Processes – Fort Worth Division (Project Number 18SMG023HR000).

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Lucine M. Willis, Director, Human Resources and Support, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Corporate Audit Response Management

Results

Introduction/Objective

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service's criminal and administrative processes – Fort Worth Division (Project Number 18SMG023HR000). Our objective was to assess the Postal Inspection Service's compliance with criminal and administrative processes, including the effectiveness of internal controls. Specifically, the review focuses on the areas of case management, accountable property, and training.

In the Fort Worth Division, there are 46 postal inspectors located in Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. From August 2017 to July 2018, the division had 299 closed cases — 80 area cases¹ and 219 jacketed cases.² We reviewed a statistical sample of 55 cases (24 area and 31 jacketed) to determine whether postal inspectors documented investigative activities in accordance with policy. To determine whether arrest details and reporting requirements were met, we reviewed a total of 42 jacketed cases with arrests. We judgmentally selected the Fort Worth Division for our initial review based on the number of investigative cases.

The OIG has a statutory requirement to provide oversight of all activities of the Postal Inspection Service. As such, we plan to conduct similar reviews of other Postal Inspection Service divisions. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information regarding the audit.

Background

The mission of the Postal Inspection Service is to support and protect the U.S. Postal Service and its employees, infrastructure, and customers; enforce the laws that defend the nation's mail system from illegal or dangerous use; and ensure public trust in the mail. Postal inspectors are law enforcement officers. The chief postal inspector reports to the postmaster general and acts as the security officer for the Postal Service.


¹ An area case is established to conduct preliminary investigative work.

² When there is indication of criminal activity warranting further review or when a serious incident or crime occurs, an individual case is opened or jacketed to document specific investigative activities.

³ Postal inspectors are required to receive threat management training for firearms, defensive tactics, and officer survival.

⁴ *Case Management Reporting Requirements for Fiscal Year 2018* provide postal inspectors with guidance for documenting investigative activities.

⁵ Domicile reviews cover administrative areas including expense reporting, workhours, and investigative processes related to case management, confidential informant program, electronic surveillance equipment, property/evidence, threat management training, and use of vehicles.



In addition to training,³ postal inspectors use various tools and resources to carry out their mission. Postal inspectors use the case management tool, called the Inspection Service Integrated Information System (ISIIS), to open and close cases, as well as to document and track case activities.⁴ Management also assigns postal inspectors accountable property, such as electronic surveillance equipment, firearms, and vehicles, to perform their work.

Annually, the Fort Worth Division conducts a quality review as part of the Compliance Self-Assessment and Domicile Review Program⁵ to ensure adherence to policies and procedures related to administrative and investigative processes. The quality review includes postal inspector self-assessments and division checklists to ensure knowledge of and compliance with Postal Inspection Service policies.

Finding #1: Case Management

Postal inspectors did not properly document investigative activities for area and jacketed cases, specifically with regards to investigative summary logs (ISL),⁶ field notes,⁷ or arrest details.

Investigative Summary Logs

Per policy,⁸ postal inspectors are required to use ISLs in area cases to record attention given or steps conducted during the investigation. ISLs are used to document activities conducted within area cases. We identified that none of the 24 area cases reviewed had the required ISL entries, including interviews conducted, documents obtained, or other investigative steps taken. Postal inspectors charged 6,125 hours to the 24 area cases without required ISLs. This represented 66 percent (6,125 of 9,304) of the total area case workhours claimed by postal inspectors during our scope period.

Field Notes

Per policy,⁹ postal inspectors are required to scan field notes and attach them to the electronic case file in ISIS prior to closing a case. Field notes are an inspector's contemporaneous record of activity conducted in the field and assist inspectors in creating subsequent summary documentation. We identified that postal inspectors did not include any field notes in most of the area and jacketed case files reviewed, as required. Specifically:

- Twelve of 16¹⁰ (75 percent) area cases reviewed did not include field notes.

***“Twelve of 16
(75 percent) area
cases reviewed
did not include
field notes”***

⁶ ISL entries record significant steps in an investigation.

⁷ Field notes detail all matters that occurred during the investigation.

⁸ *Case Management Reporting Requirements Fiscal Year 2018*, Section 170, Investigative Summary Log.

⁹ *Inspection Service Manual (ISM)*, Section 5-9.8, Field Notes, July 2018.

¹⁰ Eight of 24 cases were prevention area cases, which are not used to conduct preliminary investigations and do not require field notes.

¹¹ ISM, Section 7-2.1.3.4, Notes of the Arrest and List of Seized Items, July 2018.

¹² The closed case checklist is a standard Postal Inspection Service form that includes items such as arrest/search warrants, ISLs, field notes, investigative memorandums, and presentation letters to ensure they are attached to the case file prior to closure.

¹³ Investigative notes include the names and addresses of the persons involved, the force used by the officers, or resistance met by the officers.

¹⁴ Because there were no investigative notes, we could not determine whether any evidence was seized.

- Thirty of 31 (97 percent) jacketed cases reviewed did not include field notes.

Arrest Details

Per policy,¹¹ postal inspectors are required to complete investigative notes (of the circumstances surrounding an arrest) and prepare a detailed list of items seized as evidence for all arrests. Team leaders are then required to complete a Closed Case Checklist¹² prior to case closure to ensure that all required documents are attached in the case file. We identified that postal inspectors did not complete any arrest notes or prepare detailed lists of items seized for arrests they made. For arrests made by other law enforcement personnel, postal inspectors did not obtain reports of the arrest circumstances or lists of items seized.

In the 42 cases reviewed with arrests, postal inspectors claimed 96 arrests, 38 of which (40 percent) were made by postal inspectors and 58 of which (60 percent) were made by other law enforcement personnel.

Of the 38 postal inspector arrests:

- Thirty-one (82 percent) did not include any investigative notes¹³ detailing the circumstances surrounding the arrest, or a list of evidence seized.¹⁴

Of the 58 arrests made by other law enforcement personnel:

- Forty-eight (83 percent) did not include any investigative notes detailing the circumstances surrounding the arrest, or a list of evidence seized.

Investigative activities were not adequately documented as required because team leaders did not conduct comprehensive reviews prior to approving closed cases; therefore, cases were approved without meeting prescribed documentation requirements. When team leaders do not hold postal inspectors

accountable for complying with policies and procedures, it creates a precedent that this behavior is acceptable. As such, during interviews, postal inspectors stated that they were aware of documentation requirements, but did not always comply with the requirements.

Additionally, the Postal Inspection Service can enhance the Closed Case File checklist¹⁵ and the Compliance Self-Assessment and Domicile Review Program to help ensure compliance with case management documentation requirements.

Team leaders use the Closed Case File checklist as a guide to ensure all case management documentation requirements are adhered to prior to approving/closing the case file. The current checklist does not include all required documentation items to ensure case files are maintained in accordance with policy. For example, the checklist does not include a review of ISLs, investigative notes, or a list of seized items from arrests.

Similarly, postal inspectors use the Compliance Self-Assessment and Domicile Review Program as a quality control to ensure compliance with policies and procedures. However, the current program does not specifically define case documentation requirements. Rather, the postal inspector self-assessment checklist contains only one broad question related to case management—*“Is the postal inspector adhering to the case management reporting requirements?”* Like the Closed Case File checklist, the self-assessment checklist does not include or specify required items for case documentation.

When investigative activities are not adequately documented, postal inspectors are not executing due diligence in carrying out their responsibilities. As such, investigative conclusions and claimed results are not adequately supported; information is not available for review by team leaders, postal inspectors, and external stakeholders; and inadequate documentation could impact legal outcomes¹⁶ stemming from investigations. Additionally, when seized evidence is

not identified, there is an increased risk that evidence could be lost, stolen, or not accounted for properly.

Recommendation #1

The **Inspector-in-Charge, Fort Worth Division**, provide refresher training to team leaders regarding investigative documentation requirements and proper case closure procedures.

Recommendation #2

The **Chief Postal Inspector**, enhance the Closed Case File checklist and the Compliance Self-Assessment and Domicile Review Program to reconcile with case management documentation requirements.

Finding #2: Ammunition Inventory

The Fort Worth Division did not maintain ammunition inventories or track the division’s ammunition usage. Although the Inspection Service does not have a formal requirement to inventory or track ammunition, we identified several agencies¹⁷ with law enforcement components that require periodic inventory of ammunition or an inventory management system that tracks ammunition usage over time, including identifying reasons for increases and decreases.

From calendar years (CY) 2016 to 2018, there was a [REDACTED] percent increase in the dollar value [REDACTED] of ammunition orders at the Fort Worth Division. Although division ammunition purchases increased, the tracking of ammunition use/costs is not a formal Inspection Service requirement; and, division management did not

“The Fort Worth Division did not maintain ammunition inventories or track the division’s ammunition usage.”

15 The current closed case checklist requires a review of ISLs only for cases prior to 2004.

16 ISM, Section 5-9.8, Field Notes, July 2018. Postal inspectors’ field notes must be provided to a suspect’s attorney prior to trial. Not providing the notes could result in a mistrial as any evidence that could be used by the defense must be provided by the prosecution.

17 U.S. Department of Justice OIG report, *Audit of the United States Marshals Service’s Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives* (dated September 2018) and Government Accountability Office report, *Federal Law Enforcement: Purchases and Inventory Controls of Firearms, Ammunition, and Tactical Equipment* (dated December 2018). Law enforcement agencies include the EPA, Health and Human Services, and IRS.

provide an adequate reason for these increases. However, division management stated that there is an informal process in place to determine how much ammunition to order, which includes reviewing prior orders and estimating usage.

When periodic inventory and tracking practices are not in place, there could be accountability risk, leading to potential shortages, surpluses, unexplainable missing inventory or increased costs to the organization.

Recommendation #3

The **Chief Postal Inspector**, establish a requirement and formal process for divisions to periodically inventory and track ammunition.

Finding #3: O Key Inventory

Employees did not adequately conduct O key inventories or consistently adhere to O key issuance requirements. O keys access lookout galleries¹⁸ at postal facilities, thus restricting surveillance activities to law enforcement personnel.

Per policy,¹⁹ division personnel are required to conduct an annual inventory of O keys on hand, including obtaining a signature from the recipient acknowledging receipt when issuing O keys.

We identified that:

- From fiscal years (FY) 2012 to 2018, the Administrative Support Coordinator (ASC) assigned the responsibility for O keys did not conduct annual inventories or maintain related tracking documentation.
- From FYs 2016 to 2018, the ASC did not obtain required signatures acknowledging receipt when issuing O keys in three of four instances.
- During our site visit in September 2018, we identified that one of the three O keys maintained within the Division was missing; however, in December, division personnel located the missing key.

ASCs do not conduct annual O key inventories or adequately account for the keys because there are no controls to ensure compliance with the requirements.

¹⁸ Lookout galleries are observation areas in postal facilities used to investigate criminal activity.

¹⁹ ISM, Section 2-7.4, Keys, July 2018.

²⁰ Case Management Reporting Requirements Fiscal Year 2018, Sections 410 and 430.

²¹ These four arrests were associated with one workplace violence case and three mail theft cases.

Individuals could use missing or unaccounted-for O keys to gain unauthorized access to the lookout galleries, potentially compromising investigations, subjecting surveillance equipment to tampering or theft, or exposing law enforcement personnel to safety risk or hazardous environments.

Recommendation #4

The **Inspector-in-Charge, Fort Worth Division**, establish an oversight mechanism to ensure inventory and tracking of O keys is conducted by responsible personnel as required.

Finding #4: Arrest Reporting and Documentation

Postal inspectors did not consistently document claimed arrests made by other law enforcement personnel appropriately. For postal inspectors to claim arrests made by other law enforcement agencies, they must materially contribute to the identification and arrest of a person for a postal crime or develop additional significant evidence and bring it to the attention of the prosecutor, preferably in writing. Additionally, team leaders should report any doubt regarding claiming an arrest to the inspector-in-charge (INC) for review.²⁰

We identified that in four²¹ of 58 arrests (7 percent) made by other law enforcement agencies, postal inspectors claimed arrests without documentation to support that they made a material contribution or developed significant evidence, as required. These four instances occurred because team leaders did not consider these arrests questionable, even after they discussed the arrests with the respective postal inspectors. Additionally, team leaders stated they knew the appropriate documentation was not in the case files. As such, team leaders did not escalate the cases for INC review.

“Postal inspectors did not consistently document claimed arrests made by other law enforcement personnel appropriately.”

As the Inspection Service is obligated to accurately report arrest statistics to stakeholders and the public, claiming arrests made by other law enforcement agencies without adequate documentation could result in inaccurate and misleading reporting.

Recommendation #5

The **Inspector-in-Charge, Fort Worth Division**, reiterate to team leaders, in a formal communication, Case Management Reporting Requirements, related to documenting claimed arrests made by other law enforcement personnel.

Finding #5: Long-Term Home-to-Work Authorizations

In FY 2018, all postal inspectors in the Fort Worth Division had approved long-term home-to-work authorization²² for their assigned vehicles. However, long-term home-to-work authorization justifications did not meet the criteria for authorization and required vehicle usage analyses were not conducted.

Per policy,²³ long-term home-to-work authorization may be given to a postal inspector when the demands of an employee's assignment continuously require them to respond immediately to emergency situations or situations requiring immediate attention. Management must base authorizations on documented use of the vehicle in response to emergency situations and on the employee's commute to work. Prior to renewing authorization, the manager should analyze how the postal inspector used the vehicle over the prior 12-month period.

The following justification was used for all long-term home-to-work authorizations in the Fort Worth Division:

“Long-term home-to-work authorization is being requested for responding to emergent situations which may occur outside normal working hours. By having access to an LEV at all times, I am prepared to support and protect the Postal Service; Enforce the laws that defend the mail system from illegal or dangerous use; and Prevent nefarious activity in order to ensure public trust in the mail.”

The justification provided is general in nature and does not specify why there is a continuous need for immediate response. The justification is also open-ended and does not have a specific timeframe, nor is it based on the documented prior use of the vehicle in response to emergency situations. The INC approved all long-term home-to-work authorizations without conducting the required analyses of the postal inspector's vehicle usage for the prior 12-month period.

The INC stated that he was aware of the requirements but determined that the need for postal inspectors to always have a vehicle available for quick response to incidents and emergencies took precedence over the requirements. He further stated that because of the division's widespread geographic coverage, postal inspectors need a vehicle to respond immediately to emergency situations.

Granting long-term home-to-work authorizations without proper justification and analyses indicates noncompliance with prescribed policies and procedures.

Recommendation #6

The **Chief Postal Inspector**, instruct the inspector-in-charge, Fort Worth Division, to conduct the required analysis for long-term home-to-work vehicle requests and ensure approvals are sufficiently justified.

Management's Comments

Management agreed with our findings and recommendations.

Regarding recommendation 1, management stated that the Postal Inspection Service has previously identified an opportunity to conduct in-service functional team leader training, which will include the investigative documentation requirements identified during this audit. The target implementation date is September 30, 2020.

Regarding recommendation 2, management agreed in part, stating that the Postal Inspection Service believes additional safeguards should be implemented to ensure cases are properly documented. However, modifying the Closed Case File checklist, Compliance Self-Assessment, or Domicile Review Program will not

²² Home-to-work authorizations allow postal inspectors to drive law enforcement vehicles (LEV) to and from home and work.

²³ ISM, Section 2-8.2.3, Long-Term Authorization, July 2018.

establish those safeguards. Rather, management is re-establishing headquarter reviews to be conducted to identify potential deficiencies for corrective action. These reviews will validate case management documentation requirements. The target implementation date is September 30, 2020.

Regarding recommendation 3, management stated that, although not required, the Postal Inspection Service will establish a process for divisions to periodically inventory and track ammunition. The target implementation date is March 31, 2020.

Regarding recommendation 4, management stated that they will establish an internal control process to inventory and track the distribution of O keys in accordance with policy. The target implementation date is September 30, 2019.

Regarding recommendation 5, management stated they will provide all team leaders with formal guidance related to the documentation of arrests made by other law enforcement personnel. The target implementation date is August 31, 2019.

Regarding recommendation 6, management agreed in part, stating that they previously identified dated policy related to the use of vehicles which required re-evaluation. This policy, which includes long-term home-to-work use of vehicles, will be updated to meet their current operational model. The target implementation date is December 31, 2019.

See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

Evaluation of Management's Comments

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations and corrective actions, including those management proposed for recommendations 2 and 6, should resolve the issues identified in the report.

All recommendations require OIG concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. Recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

Appendices

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Appendix A: Additional Information

Scope and Methodology

The scope of our audit included a review of Fort Worth Division closed cases from August 2017 to July 2018. We statistically sampled 24 of 80 area cases and 31 of 219 jacketed cases to determine whether division employees followed case management requirements. However, only 12 of the 31 selected jacketed cases had arrests; therefore, we statistically selected an additional 30 jacketed cases with arrests to review, for a total of 42 jacketed cases with arrests to determine whether arrest details were provided, and reporting requirements were met.

We verified accountable property, including 122 of 324 pieces of high-value evidence, all 57 pieces of electronic surveillance equipment, and 80 firearms. Additionally, we reviewed threat management training records for 41²⁴ postal inspectors.

To accomplish our objective, we:

- Interviewed Fort Worth Division managers and postal inspectors to gain an understanding of their roles and responsibilities.
- Reviewed Postal Inspection Service policies and procedures to gain an understanding investigative and administrative requirements and processes.
- Reviewed area and jacketed cases to determine whether documentation of investigative activities was adequate and compliant with policies and procedures.
- Reviewed O key internal controls and conducted inventory.

- Reviewed tracking and monitoring of ammunition levels.
- Reviewed monitoring and tracking of ammunition at other law enforcement agencies.
- Reviewed long-term home-to-work vehicle authorizations for CYs 2017 and 2018 to determine whether approvals were properly documented.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2018 through April 2019, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on March 26, 2019, and included their comments where appropriate.

We assessed the reliability of ISIS data by reviewing source documents and interviewing responsible personnel knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Prior Audit Coverage

The OIG did not identify any prior audits or reviews related to the objective of this audit within the last five years.

²⁴ We did not review training records for five inspectors because of extended leave, detail assignments, or recent assignments.

Appendix B: Management's Comments



GARY R. BARKSDALE
CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR

UNITED STATES POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE

April 12, 2019

LAZERICK C. POLAND
DIRECTOR, AUDIT OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Review of Postal Inspection Service Criminal and Administrative
Processes – Fort Worth Division
(Report Number HR-AR-19-DRAFT)

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the recommendations contained in the draft audit report, Review of Postal Inspection Service Criminal and Administrative Processes – Fort Worth Division. Management agrees, in part, with the findings and recommendations associated with the draft report and will address each separately below.

Recommendation 1: The Inspector-in-Charge, Fort Worth Division, provide refresher training to team leaders regarding investigative documentation requirements and proper case closure procedures.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. The Postal Inspection Service has previously identified an opportunity to conduct in-service functional team leader training, which will include the investigative documentation requirements identified during this audit.

Target Implementation Date: September 30, 2020

Responsible Official: Inspector in Charge, Career Development Unit

Recommendation 2: The Chief Postal Inspector, enhance the Closed Case File checklist and the Compliance Self-Assessment and Domicile Review Program to reconcile with case management documentation requirements.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees, in part, with this recommendation. The Postal Inspection Service believes additional safeguards should be implemented to ensure cases are properly documented. Modifying the Closed Case File checklist, Compliance Self-Assessment, or Domicile Review Program will not establish those safeguards; however, we are re-establishing

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headquarter reviews to be conducted to identify potential deficiencies for corrective action. Through these reviews, the case management documentation requirements will be validated.

Target Implementation Date: September 30, 2020

Responsible Official: Deputy Chief Inspector, Headquarters Operations

Recommendation 3: The Chief Postal Inspector, establish a requirement and formal process for divisions to periodically inventory and track ammunition.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. Although not required, the Postal Inspection Service will establish a process for divisions to periodically inventory and track ammunition.

Target Implementation Date: March 31, 2020

Responsible Official: Chief Postal Inspector

Recommendation 4: The Inspector-in-Charge, Fort Worth Division, establish an oversight mechanism to ensure inventory and tracking of O keys is conducted by responsible personnel as required.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. The Postal Inspection Service will establish an internal control process to inventory and track the distribution of O keys in accordance with policy.

Target Implementation Date: September 30, 2019

Responsible Official: Chief Postal Inspector

Recommendation 5: The Inspector-in-Charge, Fort Worth Division, reiterate to team leaders, in a formal communication, Case Management Reporting Requirements, related to documenting claimed arrests made by other law enforcement personnel.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. The Postal Inspection Service will provide all team leaders with formal guidance related to the documentation of arrests made by other law enforcement personnel.

- 3 -

Target Implementation Date: August 31, 2019

Responsible Official: Deputy Chief Inspector, Headquarters Operations

Recommendation 6: The Chief Postal Inspector, instruct the Inspector-in-Charge, Fort Worth Division, to conduct the required analysis for long-term home-to-work vehicle requests and ensure approvals are sufficiently justified.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees, in part, with this recommendation. The Postal Inspection Service previously identified dated policy related to the use of vehicles which required re-evaluation. This policy, which includes long-term home-to-work use of vehicles, will be updated to meet our current operational model.

Target Implementation Date: December 31, 2019

Responsible Official: Chief Postal Inspector

Thank you,



Gary R. Barksdale
Chief Postal Inspector

cc: *Manager, Corporate Audit Response Management*



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